Nick Hirner, Thomas J. Linsmeier, & Daniel D. Wangerin (2026)
Abstract: This study examines whether income statement presentation incentives influence firms’ real economic decisions. We exploit two recent changes in accounting standards that differentially altered the presentation and measurement of pension costs. ASU 2017-07 only changed the income statement presentation of pension cost components under U. S. GAAP, while IAS 19R changed both presentation and measurement under IFRS. Using difference-in-differences designs, we find that U.S. GAAP firms with stronger presentation incentives significantly de-risked their defined benefit pension portfolios following ASU 2017-07, reallocating approximately 5% of plan assets from higher risk to lower risk investments – a market wide shift of roughly $74 billion. This response is concentrated among firms with weaker competing plan‑management incentives. In contrast, while IFRS firms generally reduced pension investment risk following IAS 19R, we find no consistent evidence of an incremental presentation effect. This pattern suggests that presentation changes affect real decisions when they occur alone (ASU 2017-07), but when a presentation change occurs together with a measurement change (IAS 19R), the response is attributable to the measurement change.
Status: Preparing for Submission
Presentations: University of Wisconsin-Madison, The Accounting Design Project (Fall 2026), Doctoral Student Day at DePaul University (Fall 2026), 35th Asian Pacific Conference on International Accounting Issues*, HARC 2027*
Co-Author Presentations: Texas A&M University, Notre Dame University*
*Scheduled
Solo Authored Project
Abstract: This study examines whether governmental reporting incentives shape real economic decisions, using GASB Statements 67 and 68 as a shock to the recognition and measurement of U.S. governmental pension liabilities. GASB 68 was the first governmental accounting standard to require full recognition of the net pension liability on sponsors' statements of net position. Further, GASB 67 and 68 introduce a blended discount rate approach to measurement that mechanically increases reported liabilities for plans without sufficient assets to cover the long-term plan liability. Using techniques from prior research on mutual fund investments, I examine how plan-sponsoring governments changed the risk intention of their plan assets following the standard changes. This research question speaks to whether accounting incentives can influence economic decision-making within the governmental setting.
Status: Data Collection and Analysis